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CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY
JURISDICTION: NATIVE AMERICAN
CONTROL OF THE RESERVATION
ENVIRONMENT
Native American Tribes,1 America's original inhabitants, have a
strong and unique relationship with the natural environment.2 Re-
cently, many tribes have taken steps to preserve the environment in
"Indian country." 3 While attempting to assert regulatory authority
I. Because courts and legislatures commonly use the term "Indian," this Note will
use the terms "Indian" and "Native American" interchangeably. The term "Native
American" or "native" is generally preferred, however, when referring to the aboriginal
peoples of North America.
2. See Richard A. Du Bey et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment: Haz-
ardous Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449, 450 (1988); see also
Chief Justice Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARiz. L.
REv. 225 (1989). With regard to tribal courts' perspective when rendering decisions,
the Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation's Supreme Court stated, "[w]e refer to the earth
and sky as Mother Earth and Father Sky. These are not catchy titles; they represent
our understanding of our place. The earth and sky are our relatives .... Understand-
ing this relationship is essential to understanding traditional Navajo concepts which
may be applied in cases concerning natural resources and the environment." Id. at 233-
34.
3. The statutory definition of "Indian country" includes:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, in-
cluding rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits
of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
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over their territory, tribal regulatory programs inevitably reach non-
native people and enterprises located within the reservation.4 How-
ever, environmental protection and regulation has long been the exclu-
sive domain of federal and state regulatory agencies.5 These assertions
of tribal authority have led to jurisdictional conflicts involving ques-
tions of tribal, federal, and state sovereignty. Tribal implementation of
environmental regulatory schemes thus adds a new chapter to the re-
cent proliferation of Indian litigation.6
This Note will focus on the ability of tribal governments to effec-
tively and lawfully implement their own environmental programs to
both Indians and non-Indians located on tribal land. Part I examines
the common law origins of tribal sovereignty and the federal govern-
ment's inconsistent Indian policies which are the source of most of to-
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
Thus, "Indian country" technically encompasses more territory than a reservation
because the term "Indian country" includes native lands located outside the reservation
borders as well as land within reservation boundaries. In general, this Note will use the
terms "Indian country," "native lands, .... reservation lands" and similar terms to de-
scribe all land within the exterior boundaries of Indian country as described by the
statute.
Although the above definition is specifically applicable in the criminal context, it is
often used to describe Indian territory in the civil context as well. See DeCouteau v.
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
4. See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1982)
(hereinafter COHEN) for a historical overview of self-government in Indian country and
the challenges by states and non-natives. The modern Indian reservation is a "checker-
board" pattern of Indian owned and non-Indian owned lands. CHARLES F. WILKIN-
SON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 9 (1987). The checkerboard pattern is
the result of early federal Indian policies which allowed settlement and alienation of
reservation lands. Id. at 8.
Generally, reservation lands are either held in trust by the federal government, held
in fee by a tribe, or held in fee by non-Indians. Land held in fee by non-natives (herein-
after "fee land") has the greatest implication for purposes of this Note. Jurisdictional
conificts frequently involve fee land. Tribes attempt to enjoin state action affecting fee
land within the reservation, and state or non-native landholders attempt to bar tribal
assertions of regulatory jurisdiction on fee land.
5. Du Bey, supra note 2, at 450-51. One consequence of the federal and state regu-
latory agency's exclusive domain over environmental protection is the reservation envi-
ronment's virtual neglect. Id. at 451. The lack of protection stems from the tribal
governments' inability to directly participate in, or receive funding through, federal en-
vironmental grant programs administered by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). Id.
6. See Peter W. Sly, EPA and Indian Reservations: Justice Stevens' Factual Ap-
proach, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,429, 10,430 n.12 (1990) (noting that
"[s]ince 1970, the Supreme Court has issued more Indian law decisions than in the
combined fields of consumer and antitrust law").
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day's legal problems. Parts II and III consider two potential threats to
tribal implementation of environmental programs throughout the res-
ervation. Part II analyzes state assertions of regulatory jurisdiction in
Indian country. Part III explores the limits of tribal jurisdiction with
respect to the ability of tribes to regulate non-Indians on reservations.
Part IV reviews federal environmental statutes and their inconsistent
treatment of Indian tribes. Finally, Part V suggests various ways in
which Congress can respect tribal rights to self-determination and pre-
clude endless and costly litigation between state and federal or tribal
authorities.
I. THE ORIGINS OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
In two early Indian law cases, Chief Justice John Marshall boldly7
set the framework for the current federal Indian policy which views
tribes as sovereign political bodies.' In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,9
Marshall first enumerated the trust relationship 0 between the United
States and the tribes. Although Marshall ruled that the Indians were
not independent "foreign nations" within the meaning of the Constitu-
7. Marshall's decisions were bold because they directly conflicted with President
Andrew Jackson's executive policy at the time. Jackson's administration vigorously
pursued a policy to move Indians to Western lands. In his First Annual Message to
Congress in December 1829, Jackson clearly prescribed that "if [Indians] remain within
the limits of the States they must be subject to [the states'] laws." President Jackson on
Indian Removal (Dec. 8, 1829), reprinted in FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 47, 48 (1990).
8. See President's Statement on Indian Policy, 1983 Pun. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983)
[hereinafter Reagan Indian Policy]. Former President Ronald Reagan's official Indian
Policy Statement explicitly recognized Indian tribes as sovereign political entities by
acknowledging the enduring "government-to-government relationship between the
United States and Indian tribes." Id. at 96. See also Proclamation No. 6080 3 C.F.R.
192 (1990). Although President Bush has not issued an official policy statement con-
cerning Indians, Congress designated "National American Indian Heritage Week" for
the week beginning December 3, 1989. In his proclamation, President Bush stated that
"tribal elected governments and the United States have now established a unique and
special government-to-government relationship ... we look forward to greater eco-
nomic independence and self-sufficiency for Native Americans, and we reaffirm our sup-
port for increased Indian control over tribal government affairs." Id. at 193.
9. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
10. The trust relationship has been described as "one of the primary cornerstones of
Indian law." COHEN, supra note 4, at 221. The relationship defines the standards of
conduct for the federal government when interacting with native governments. Id. at
220. Treaties, statutes, executive orders, and administrative rules and regulations are
construed in light of federal trust obligations; thus, federal action will be read in a man-
ner favorable to Indians. Id. at 220-21.
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tion, " he described them as "domestic dependent nations"12 to whom
the federal government owes a special responsibility."3 This responsi-
bility includes the general protection 4 and the insurance of tribal na-
tions' economic stability. 15
One year later, in Worcester v. Georgia,6 Justice Marshall over-
turned a Georgia law forbidding whites in Cherokee country without a
state permit. 7 Worcester became the first case in which the Supreme
Court held that state law is not applicable to affairs within Indian terri-
tory.'" Thus, Worcester defined the state jurisdictional limits by geo-
graphical boundaries rather than by personal jurisdiction. 9
The federal-tribal trust relationship described in Cherokee Nation
and the jurisdictional analysis from Worcester laid the groundwork for
modem legal analysis of tribal regulations. Just as the Cherokee Na-
tion Court recognized Indian tribes as distinct governmental entities,20
recent presidential administrations have explicitly recognized tribes as
11. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. Marshall did not grant relief to the Indians, who sought
to enjoin the state of Georgia from implementing their laws in Indian country, because
the Constitution extends power to the judiciary to hear cases and controversies only
"between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects." Id. at
15 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). Therefore, he held that the Court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 20.
12. Id. at 17.
13. Id. Marshall stated that the Indians' "relation to the United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian." Id. See also Larry B. Leventhal, American Indians-
The Trust Responsibility: An Overview, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 625 (1985) (discussing the
parameters of the trust relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes);
Mark Allen, Comment, Native American Control of Tribal Natural Resource Develop-
ment in the Context of the Federal Trust and Tribal Self-Determination, 16 B.C. ENVTL.
ArF. L. REv. 857 (1989) (discussing the trust responsibility in the context of environ-
mental regulation on reservation lands).
14. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (discussing protection from
state intrusion as part of the federal trust responsibility).
15. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 ("They look to our government for protection ... [and]
appeal to it for relief to their wants..
16. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
17. The petitioner in Worcester was a non-Indian missionary who was condemned
to four years of hard labor in a Georgia penitentiary. Id. at 532. The Court held that
the Georgia law was unconstitutional and had no force to deprive plaintiff of his prop-
erty or liberty. Id. at 596.
18. COHEN, supra note 4, at 259.
19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557. Native tribes are "distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all
the lands within those boundaries." Id.
20. Earlier Indian cases were not particularly sympathetic to the concept of Indian
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sovereign nations.2 ' Furthermore, Justice Marshall considered tribes
to be much like states22 in terms of self-government; similarly, today's
Congress often treats tribes as states for purposes of implementing their
own environmental programs.2 3 Thus, the source of today's jurisdic-
tional disputes in Indian country does not lie in philosophical differ-
ences between today's government and that of the early Republic.
Instead, the source lies in several important nineteenth century devel-
opments regarding federal Indian policy. Soon after Justice Marshall
laid the foundation for tribal sovereignty, the principles established in
Cherokee Nation and Worcester began to erode.
24
A. The "Checkerboard" Reservation
A series of nineteenth century congressional acts led to the severe
erosion of Indian land holdings. The 1830 Indian Removal Act2 5 au-
thorized the President to exchange land west of the Mississippi River
for eastern tribal lands.2 6 The forceful removal27 of the Indians cre-
ated many western Indian land holdings and reservations in the
West.2" The Indians' migration to the western frontier solved nothing
tribal sovereignty. See, eg., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
21. See supra note 8 for a discussion of recent Indian policies.
22. See 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (recognizing the Cherokee tribe as a body
capable of managing its own affairs and stating that "they have been uniformly been
treated as a state from the settlement of our country").
23. See infra notes 149-168 and accompanying text for a detailed description of
environmental laws that view tribes as states.
24. President Jackson allegedly reacted to the Worcester decision by stating, "John
Marshall made his law; now let him enforce it." COHEN, supra note 4, at 83. In fact,
the administration at the time did nothing to enforce the decision. Followers of Jackson
requested the governor of Georgia to pardon the petitioner to avid potential embar-
rassment resulting from the President's receipt of an enforcement order from the
Supreme Court. Id. at 83 n.175.
25. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
26. Id.
27. Although Jackson's removal policy was contemplated as voluntary, in practice
the program was coercive. The military was needed for effective removal because the
Indians generally resisted leaving their homeland. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 91-92;
see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law,
31 ARiz. L. REv. 237, 239-58 (1989) (positing that the removal stems from the legacy
of European-based racism which continues to dominate federal policy and attitudes to-
ward natives).
28. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 124 (stating that the rapid expansion of the white
1992]
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and merely delayed the problems that imminent western expansion
would soon create.
As the frontier shrank, differences between westbound settlers and
Indian tribes became more prominent.29 In 1887, Congress passed the
Dawes Act (also called the General Allotment Act)30 which severely
altered the original title rights on most reservations. Under the Act,
individual Indians were allotted parcels of reservation land,31 while
surplus lands were sold to non-Indian homesteaders.32 This parceling
of reservation land had devastating effects on Indian landholdings,33
resulting in the present day "checkerboard" ownership pattern on
many reservations.34 Checkerboard ownership is the principal source
of most of today's jurisdictional problems.35
While the Indian policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries attempted to assimilate the Indians into the white culture,
population made it necessary to limit the mobility of Indian tribes and force them to
settle on permanent reservations).
29. Id. at 132. Eastern philanthropists wanted to cultivate and civilize the "savage"
Indians and the western expansionists wanted the Indians' land. Other interests in-
cluded those of private land speculators, the timber industry and the railroads. Id.
30. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (1988).
31. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 130-31. Title to this land was held in trust by the
federal government for twenty-five years or longer at the President's discretion. Id. at
131. During this period, any alienation or encumbrances were void. Id. If surplus land
existed after the allotments were made, the government usually bought the land and
sold it to private parties. Id.
32. Id. at 130-32. The Dawes Act and other nineteenth century Indian policies
were actually attempts to destroy the tribal system which reformers thought was neces-
sary in order to allow the Indians to fully participate in the American lifestyle. Id. at
131. Reformers also attempted to terminate the existence of reservations because of
fundamental differences between the Indians and the Americans regarding property
ownership concepts. Id. at 131-32. The idea of individual land ownership was central
to the American way of life. On the other hand, the Indians firmly believed in commu-
nal property ownership. Dawes Act advocates felt that assimilation would be impossi-
ble unless these socialist communities were destroyed. Id. at 131 n.39. Therefore,
individual ownership, through allotments, became necessary to meet the assimilationist
goal. Id. at 131.
33. By the time the allotment program came to an end, Indian landholdings dimin-
ished from 138 million to 52 million acres. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 8.
34. Id. at 8-9 (noting that Indian country now contains tribal land, allotted trust
land held by Indians, fee land held by both Indians and non-Indians, federal public land
and state land).
35. Checkerboard jurisdiction is inefficient and results in various possibilities of tri-
bal, federal and state jurisdiction. Id. at 9. Moreover, the lack of a well-defined juris-
dictional doctrine causes repetitious and unnecessary litigation. Id.
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support for assimilation began to wane with the implementation of
New Deal reforms.36 Ultimately, the assimilation policy was repudi-
ated in 1934; however, the jurisdictional picture on reservations was
irreversibly clouded.
B. The Road To Tribal Self-Determination
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA)37 was an attempt to
encourage tribal economic development and self-determination.38 The
basic premise behind the IRA was to allow native tribes to govern
themselves effectively with the federal government's help. 39 Although
the IRA was a positive step towards true tribal self-determination, it
contained many flaws." Dissatisfaction with the Act resulted in sev-
eral amendments and attacks on the IRA's principles in the 1940's and
1950's, including regression to an assimilation policy.41 The late
1960's, however, saw the emergence of tribal self-determination as the
dominant federal Indian policy.42
Current federal Indian policies do not threaten tribal autonomy.43
36. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 145-52 (discussing the new policy of preserving the
Indian culture and the laws enacted to fulfill this goal).
37. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461, 462, 464, 465, 466-70, 471-73, 474, 475, 476-78, 479 (1988)).
38. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 147.
39. Id.
40. For example, Section 16 of the Act permitted the tribes to draft and adopt their
own constitution. Id. at 149. However, most of these constitutions were standardized
forms provided by the Department of the Interior which granted only limited tribal
autonomy. Id. In addition, the IRA authorized the purchase of new lands for tribal
use but Congress never appropriated the necessary money. Id. at 150.
41. Id. at 153-59 (outlining the specific attacks on and proposals for the IRA).
42. See generally President's Special Message to the Congress on the Problems of
the American Indian: "The Forgotten American," PuB. PAPERS 335 (March 6, 1968)
(President Johnson's Message to Congress on Indian Affairs); President's Message to
Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970) (President Nixon's
Message to Congress on Indian Affairs). Also, several congressional acts from the
1960's and 1970's manifested the self-determination policy. See, eg., Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1988); Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-50n, 455-58(e) (1988).
43. Although beyond the scope of this Note, current federal Indian policies are not
immune from serious criticism. They have been described as attempts to cut funding
for tribal governments while doing as little political damage as possible during a budget-
ary crisis. Indeed, recent administrations may be shirking their federal trust obliga-
tions. The policy statements' rhetoric, at the very least, clearly supports tribal self-
determination. The administration should be held accountable for such rhetoric
through a continued federal-tribal cooperation. See Allen, supra note 13, at 885-87.
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Other barriers to tribal autonomy, however, continue to exist. One po-
tential barrier arises when states attempt to assert regulatory jurisdic-
tion in the Indian country.' As the next section demonstrates, federal
courts have not clearly articulated when a state may lawfully assert
regulatory authority over tribal lands.45
II. LIMITS OF STATE REGULATORY JURISDICTION
The landmark case of Williams v. Lee4 6 opened the modem era of
federal Indian law.47 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a state court has civil jurisdiction over reservation Indians."
In Williams, a non-native store owner operating on a Navajo Indian
Reservation sought to collect payment for goods sold to an Indian and
his wife on credit.49 The petitioners moved to dismiss, asserting that
the tribal court, rather than the state court, had jurisdiction.5° In
granting the motion, the Supreme Court ruled that state court jurisdic-
tion unlawfully infringed on the ability of the tribes to make and en-
force their own laws.51 Moreover, the Court found that a party's non-
44. Another jurisdictional dispute occurs when states and tribes assert criminal ju-
risdiction in Indian country. The unique problems related to criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country are beyond the scope of this Note. For a more detailed analysis of this
area of Indian law, see, e.g., COHEN, supra note 4, at 286-308; Robert N. Clinton, Crim-
inal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz.
L. REv. 503 (1976). See also Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990) (holding that a tribe
has no criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who is not a member of the tribe asserting
jurisdiction); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (upholding tribal criminal
jurisdiction over tribal members); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978) (holding that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the
reservation).
45. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)
(stating that "there is no rigid rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular
state law may be applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members").
46. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
47. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 1-3 (discussing the importance of Williams to
all subsequent Indian law decisions).
48. 358 U.S. at 218.
49. Id. at 217-18.
50. Id. at 218. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected this argument, holding that
no congressional act expressly denies Arizona courts' jurisdiction over the matter. Id.
51. Id. at 223. In so holding, the Court stated that "[there can be no doubt that to
allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal
courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to
govern themselves." Id.
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native status was immaterial.5 2 The Court invoked the "infringement
test" stating that, absent Congressional authority to the contrary, a
state has regulatory authority as long as such authority does not in-
fringe on tribal self-government.5 3
Although based on logical notions of tribal sovereignty, the "in-
fringement test" is problematic in its application. The test does not
articulate clear standards to determine when states infringe on tribal
self-governance.54 Fortunately, a new test evolved in order to better
determine the validity of state actions on the reservation.
A. Preemption
In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission," the Supreme
Court held that a state cannot tax a reservation Indian for income de-
rived exclusively from reservation resources.5 6 The Court noted that
the modern trend was away from the "infringement test" and toward
reliance on federal preemption when considering the validity of state
laws in Indian country.5 7 Thus, the Court ruled that federal treaties 8
and laws59 preempted the state tax.'
52. 358 U.S. at 223.
53. Id. at 220. "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id. Cf. Utah & Northern Railway Co. v.
Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 31 (1885) (noting that a state only has jurisdiction over an Indian
reservation where the controversy is in its cognizance).
The basis of the Court's infringement analysis was the notion of tribal sovereignty as
articulated in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 358 U.S. at 218-20.
54. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 4 (stating that "in the crucial area of tribal-
state relations, the specific shape of doctrine has yet to be formed").
55. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
56. Id. at 165. McClanahan sought a refund of state taxes withheld from her reser-
vation wages. When the state refused, she sued the state requesting the return of her
money and a declaration that the state tax was not applicable to reservation Indians.
Id. at 165-66.
57. Id. at 172. "[Ihe trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sover-
eignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption. The
modern cases thus tend to... look.., to the applicable treaties and statutes which
define the limits of state power." Id. (citation omitted).
58. "The beginning of our analysis must be with the treaty which the United States
government entered with the Navajo Nation in 1868." Id. at 173-74.
59. Statutes that the Court considered in rendering its decision included the Ari-
zona Enabling Act, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the Buck Act (a federal
guidance system for state taxation of those living on federal land). Id. at 175-78.
60. Id. at 173. "When the relevant treaty or statutes are read with this tradition of
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Reliance on the preemption analysis did not render the "infringe-
ment test" irrelevant. Instead, tribal sovereignty became the backdrop
for the preemption analysis.61 Courts have struggled, however, to fit
sovereignty notions into their preemption analysis.62
B. Current Doctrine
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,63 the Supreme Court
articulated the present approach to jurisdictional conflicts between
states and tribes when a state seeks authority over reservation activities
of non-natives. 64 The modem test combines elements of both McClan-
ahan and Williams by barring state jurisdiction if the state law either
infringes on tribal sovereignty or is preempted by federal law.65
Although each is an independent barrier to state jurisdiction,66 the two
are related. 67 Today, most courts rely primarily on preemption analy-
sis.68 Against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty, preemption analysis
requires a "particularized inquiry" into the relevant state, federal and
sovereignty in mind, we think it clear that Arizona has exceeded its lawful authority by
attempting to tax appellant." Id.
61. Id. at 172. "The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it
provides a definitive resolution of the issues... but because it provides a backdrop
against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read." Id.
62. See, eg., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482-83
(1976) (upholding a state tax on cigarettes sold to non-natives on a reservation, relying
on the state's interest in taxing non-natives rather than tribal sovereignty interests).
63. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
64. Id. at 137. In Bracker, Arizona sought to apply a licensing requirement and
fuel tax to a non-Indian logging company operating exclusively on the Fort Apache
Reservation.
65. Id. at 142. "First, the exercise of such authority may be pre-empted by federal
law. Second, it may unlawfully infringe 'on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."' Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220
(1959)) (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 143. Either barrier, standing alone, would be a sufficient basis to hold a
state law inapplicable to activities undertaken on Indian land or by tribal members. Id.
67. Id. The Indians' right to self-government is ultimately subject to the broad
power of Congress. Moreover, the tradition of tribal sovereignty over the reservation
and the tribe must aid in determining whether federal law preempts the exercise of state
authority.
68. This reliance is probably due to the difficulty courts have in discerning unlawful
infringement. Furthermore, legislative guidelines are better articulated in subject mat-
ter statutes than the vague treaties establishing Indian country. See WILKINSON, supra
note 4, at 94.
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tribal interests.69 The Bracker Court balanced the various interests
and determined that the federal and tribal interests outweighed state
interests.7
C. Balancing the Interests in the Environmental Context
A particularized inquiry into the tribal, federal, and state interests in
environmental protection demonstrates the states' inability to regulate
non-native enterprises operating on the reservation.71 Because air,
69. 448 U.S. at 145. "This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute con-
ceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the
nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to deter-
mine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate fed-
eral law." Id. See generally Stephen M. Feldman, Comment, The Developing Test For
State Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Application in the Context of Environ-
mental Law, 61 OR. L. REv. 561 (1982) (applying the particularized inquiry to environ-
mental regulatory laws).
70. 448 U.S. at 145-53. As to the federal interests, the Court emphasized the com-
prehensive and pervasive nature of the government's regulation which included specific
congressional acts and detailed regulations by the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 145.
The Court further noted that imposition of the state taxes would undermine federal
authority and objectives. Id. at 149. See also Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 (1965) (holding that pervasive federal regulation of Indian
traders prohibited a state tax on a non-Indian company operating a retail trading busi-
ness on a reservation).
With respect to tribal interests, the Court noted that the tax would undermine the
federal policy of supporting the tribe's ability "to revitalize their self-government" and
take control of their "business and economic affairs." 448 U.S. at 149 (quoting Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 (1973)).
As to the state's interest, the Court found that the general interest in raising revenue
was not sufficient to allow state intrusion into the federal regulatory scheme. 448 U.S.
at 150.
71. Several commentators reached this conclusion even before the Supreme Court
articulated the balancing test in Bracker. See, eg., J. Kemper Will, Indian Lands Envi-
ronment-Who Should Protect It, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 465, 504 (1978) (postulating
that states will not have jurisdiction over non-Indian operations on a reservation with
regard to environmental issues); Lynne E. Petros, Comment, The Applicability of the
Federal Pollution Acts to Indian Reservations: A Case for Tribal Self-Government, 48 U.
COLO. L. Rav. 63, 93 (1976) (stating that the Indians' interests in self-government man-
date tribal jurisdiction over environmental regulation).
Post-Bracker commentators reaching the conclusion that states are unable to regulate
non-native enterprises on reservations include: Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow
Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation,
and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WAsH. L. REv. 581, 659 (1989) (concluding that
state environmental laws are preempted by federal law and Indian sovereignty); Du
Bey, supra note 2, at 503 (noting that absent specific statutory language authorizing
state jurisdiction over Indian country, states do not possess the power to implement
environmental regulatory programs); Stephen M. Christenson, Note, Regulatory Juris-
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water, and land pollution often know no boundaries, all three types of
government have substantial interests in protecting their citizens from
the dangers of pollution emanating from reservation lands.72
Federal interests stem, in part, from their trust obligation to protect
native governments from unlawful state intrusion.73 In the area of pol-
lution control, the trust responsibility includes preventing tribal lands
from becoming a haven for environmental statute violators and encour-
aging native governments to effectively develop, implement and enforce
their own environmental programs.74 In addition, federal interests in-
clude the general policy of encouraging tribal self-determination. 75
Inherent in this general self-determination policy is the policy of pro-
moting tribal control over the reservation environment.76
General tribal sovereignty interests and their ability to regulate res-
ervation territory are subject to a balancing test when determining the
validity of state actions.77 In the environmental protection area, native
diction over Non-Indian Hazardous Waste in Indian Country, 72 IowA L. REV. 1091,
1116 (1987) (concluding that tribal governments are the proper authority to regulate
non-Indians under federal environmental statutes). But see Leslie Allen, Who Should
Control Hazardous Waste on Native American Lands? Looking Beyond Washington De-
partment of Ecology v. EPA, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 115 (1987) (reaching the conclusion
that states should have regulatory jurisdiction over hazardous waste in Indian country).
72. Royster & Fausett, supra note 71, at 584-85.
73. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (noting that protecting
tribal governments from state intrusions on the reservation was one of the initial reasons
for developing the federal trust responsibilities).
74. The federal government is just beginning to fulfill their trust duties with respect
to allowing native governments to establish their own environmental regulatory
schemes. See The Indian Environmental Regulatory Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-408, § 1, 104 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2991) (establish-
ing grants to tribes for the specific purpose of enabling them to develop, monitor and
enforce tribal environmental laws).
See generally Allen, supra note 13 for a discussion of the federal trust obligations in
the environmental context.
75. See supra notes 8 and 42 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of recent
presidential administrations' Indian policy goals of promoting tribal self-determination.
76. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1984) [here-
inafter EPA INDIAN POLICY] (stating that the EPA will recognize native governments
as the primary parties responsible for establishing standards and policy affecting Indian
reservations; the EPA will also encourage tribes to assume certain management respon-
sibilities for environmental programs); see also The Environmental Protection Agency
and Tribal Governments, AM. INDIAN L. NEWSL. (American Indian Law Center, Albu-
querque, N.M.), Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 4 (summarizing the main points of the EPA Indian
policy).
77. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir.
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governments have a particular interest in ensuring that the reservation
does not become a dumping ground for hazardous waste or a regula-
tion free sanctuary for enterprises looking for loopholes around costly
pollution control laws.7" A related tribal concern is the threat of pollu-
tion spillover from nearby off-reservation sources.7 9 As the political
bodies closest to the reservation population, 0 native governments are
directly responsible and accountable for the health and welfare of their
people."1 Indeed, tribal governments are best able to determine their
people's needs and the condition of their land. In addition, native in-
terests include the right to control land use on the reservation82 and the
1981) (suggesting that the state of Washington may not regulate waterways on a reser-
vation because the regulation of water on a reservation is critical to the tribes); Segundo
v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987) (considering the tribe's
land use interests in striking down state rent control ordinances); cf. Rice v. Rehner,
463 U.S. 713, 720 (1983) (finding that when there is a lack of Indian traditions in a
particular activity, the backdrop of tribal sovereignty is given less weight when balanc-
ing federal, tribal and state interests).
78. See, e.g., EPA Surveys Indian Tribes For First Look at Environmental Problems
on Reservations, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1424 (Dec. 19, 1986) (citing results of EPA study
indicating that water quality, solid waste, and sewage treatment are serious problems on
many reservations); Study finds L200 Sites near Indian Lands, Recommends Immediate
Action at Six Locations, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1228, 1228-29 (Nov. 8, 1985) (identifying
nearly 1,200 hazardous waste generators or sites on or near Indian land and indicating
that "midnight dumping" is a contributing factor to the growing pollution problem).
79. See Royster & Fausett, supra note 71, at 651 n.276 (arguing that spillovers
should not only be a state concern but also a tribal concern because tribes are just as
threatened by off-reservation pollution sources as states are by on-reservation sources).
80. See Reagan Indian Policy, supra note 8, at 96. Former President Reagan stated,
"[t]his administration believes that responsibilities and resources should be restored to
the governments which are closest to the people served. This philosophy applies not
only to State and local governments but also to federally recognized American Indian
tribes." Id. The former President recognized that native governments, rather than
states, have the primary authority over the well-being of their people. Id.
81. See infra note Ill and accompanying text for a discussion of how tribal con-
cerns become more important when the tribe's health and welfare is implicated.
82. Several courts have upheld native land use and zoning authority over non-native
lands on the reservation. See, e.g., Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387,
1393 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that "[i]t is beyond question that land use regulation
is within the Tribe's legitimate sovereign authority over its lands"); Knight v. Shoshone
& Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1982) (opining that "the inter-
est of the Tribes in preserving and protecting their homeland from exploitation justifies
the zoning code," notwithstanding the fact that the code affects non-Indians); see also
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1975) (holding that tribes can subject
non-Indians to liquor sales regulations); Pinoleville Indian Community v. Mendocino
County, 684 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (enjoining operations of asphalt and
cement plants because of the threatened injury to land, water, air, as well as the health
of Indians); Jane E. Scott, Note, Zoning: Controlling Land Use on the Checkerboard:
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related right to control the extent of reservation development.8 3
State interests include spillover threats from tribal to state lands,"4
the possibility of relatively lenient native pollution standards 5 and the
potential inability of tribes to effectively control pollution. 6 Moreover,
the desire to regulate all lands within its border, including Indian coun-
The Zoning Powers of Indian Tribes after Montana v. United States, 10 AM. INDIAN L.
RaV. 187 (1982) (noting the increasing responsibility that Indian tribes have over the
management of environmental resources on their reservations).
83. See Reagan Indian Policy, supra note 8, at 98 ("Tribal governments have the
responsibility to determine the extent and the methods of developing the tribe's natural
resources.").
84. This interest is essentially nullified because tribal concerns regarding spillover
pollution are equally as great as state concerns. See Royster & Fausett, supra note 71,
at 652.
85. Compare Allen, supra note 71, at 98 n.177 (arguing that a state's most pressing
interest is protecting its environmental program from lesser tribal standards; discounts
the threat from neighboring states because states rarely share urban developments and
are often separated by geographic features) with Royster & Fausett, supra note 71, at
654 n.287 (arguing that distinguishing state-state borders from state-tribal borders is
chimerical).
Many states are legitimately concerned that waste management companies, in an at-
tempt to evade state regulation and taxes, will offer tribes lucrative proposals to locate
on reservation land. In practice, however, many tribes that have been tempted with
such lucrative proposals have rejected them out of concern for their land. See, eg.,
Macy Hager et al., 'Dances with Garbage', NEWSWEK, Apr. 29, 1991, at 36; Bill Lan-
brecht, Arizona Indian Tribe Backs Out of Deal to Accept Toxic Waste, ST. Louis Posr-
DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 1991, at Al; Ronald Smothers, Future in Mind, Choctaws Reject
Plan For Landfill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991, § 1, at 22; Roger Worthington, Tribes
Resist Tempting Landfill Offers, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1991, at C4.
86. Many tribes are extremely destitute and may lack the financial resources and
expertise to effectively implement and enforce pollution control laws. However, the
EPA must approve tribal programs and provide education and technical assistance to
the tribes. See generally EPA INDIAN POLICY, supra note 76.
In addition, the federal government recognizes native governments' need for financial
assistance. See Indian Environmental Regulatory Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-408, 104 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2991) (appropriating
funding and authorizing the Department of Health and Human Services to award
grants to tribes for environmental regulatory purposes).
Environmental funding exemplifies federal recognition of their trust responsibilities.
See 136 CONG. REc. 56866 (daily ed. May 23, 1990) (stating that "[tfor many years,
Indian tribes have been attempting to address their own environmental problems with-
out adequate federal assistance") (statement of Sen. McCain).
Finally, Senator McCain introduced a bill on August 2, 1991 for the purpose of in-
creasing tribal governments' capacity for waste management on Indian lands. This bill
explicitly recognizes the federal trust responsibility toward tribal governments and ac-
knowledges the inherent authority of tribes to regulate tribal lands. It also seeks to
establish a system of tribal regulation and federal review of waste management and
disposal activities and to provide technical and financial assistance to tribal govern-
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try,8 7 and to regulate non-native state citizens,"8 has boosted state in-
terests in regulating fee land. 9
Another interest which is not directly attributable to tribal, federal,
or state governments includes avoiding checkerboard jurisdiction.' °
Such jurisdiction creates inconsistent standards and piecemeal author-
ity which leads to confusion among the regulated states.91 However, it
is well settled that checkerboard jurisdiction is avoidable only by giving
the tribes sole authority to control the reservation because the states
cannot regulate the natives or the reservation.92
Although each respective government has compelling interests in
regulating Indian country, the conclusion that tribal government laws
preempt state environmental laws when applied to the reservation is
unavoidable. Reservation activities, including those on fee land, di-
rectly affect native Americans. Since tribal governments have primary
authority over the health and welfare of their people, environmental
ments to effectively implement waste management programs. S. 1687, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 2-3 (1991).
87. See Allen, supra note 71, at 99-100 (asserting that states are concerned over the
havoc that the patchwork of regulatory jurisdiction wreaks on unified environmental
programs).
88. Concededly, a tribe's regulatory interest diminishes when their authority
reaches non-Indians. However, courts have consistently held that native governments
have jurisdiction over territory and not merely over people. See supra notes 16-19 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the origin of this rule.
89. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional Conflidts: An Analysis
of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and Indian Lands, 2 U.C.L.A. J. ENVrL. L. &
POL'Y 145, 156-62 (1982) for a historical discussion of legitimate state interests in regu-
lating native lands.
90. Just because checkerboard ownership patterns exist does not mean that checker-
board jurisdiction must also exist. See, eg., Craighton Goeppele, Note, Solutions For
Uneasy Neighbors: Regulating the Reservation Environment After Brendale v. Confeder-
ated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989), 65 WASH. L.
REv. 417, 424-25 (1990) (arguing that "[c]omprehensive planning is impossible with
two uncoordinated, independent bodies regulating land use on the reservation"); Jessica
S. Gerrard, Note, Undermining Tribal Land Use Regulatory Authority: Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 349, 375 (1990) (suggesting that,
under the current checkerboard zoning scheme, comprehensive land use regulation will
never be achieved).
91. See Goeppele, supra note 90, at 424-25.
92. See, eg., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207
(1987) (prohibiting the imposition of state and county gambling laws within the reserva-
tion because .state laws are applicable to tribal Indians only if Congress expressly pro-
vides); Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a state has no authority under RCRA to regulate Indian hazardous waste
on a reservation).
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regulation is in their hands.93 Additionally, the trust relationship
which intertwines both federal and tribal interests tips the scale in
favor of the Indians.14 Perhaps the most vital interest shifting the bal-
ance toward native governments, particularly in the environmental
context, is the special relationship native Americans have with their
land.9 5
The conclusion that states are unable to regulate any part of the res-
ervation environment does not end the inquiry. The question still re-
mains: Who fills the regulatory gap? Increasingly, tribes have
attempted to fill the gap, but their success has been limited by judi-
cially-imposed barriers to tribal jurisdiction over non-native reserva-
tion activity. 6 Inevitably, conflicts arise when tribes assert jurisdiction
throughout the reservation, especially when their jurisdiction reaches
non-Indians on fee land.97
III. THE SCOPE OF TRIBAL REGULATORY POWER
A. Montana and Its Exceptions
Native American governments have exclusive jurisdiction over non-
natives on tribal land.98 However, Montana v. United States,99 the
93. See Royster & Fausett, supra note 71, at 655 (asserting that native governments
should regulate the reservation environment because pollution directly affects the health
and welfare of tribal members).
94. See supra notes 7-24 and accompanying text for an historical overview of the
development of the federal-tribal trust relationship.
95. See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 1987) (find-
ing the tribe's power to manage the use of their natural resources particularly important
in precluding Montana's assertion of taxes on coal mined within the Crow reservation),
aff'd, 484 U.S. 997 (1988); see also Tso, supra note 2, at 234. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation described the unique relationship between Indians
and their environment:
[W]e are so related to the earth and the sky that we cannot be separated without
harm. The protection and defense of both must be preserved. On the other hand,
the dominant society views things in terms of separateness, of compartmentaliza-
tion. For this reason, the Navajo Nation is best able to make the laws and deci-
sions regarding our own preservation and development. Id.
96. See generally Russel L. Barsh, Is There Any Indian "Law" Left? A Review of the
Supreme Court's 1982 Term, 59 WASH. L. REv. 863 (1984) (criticizing several Supreme
Court decisions which limit tribal jurisdiction in several legal contexts).
97. See supra notes 46-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of jurisdictional
conflicts between states and tribes and the judicial tests applied.
98. See, eg., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 343-44 (1983)
(recognizing "the strong interests favoring exclusive tribal jurisdiction" in holding that
"concurrent jurisdiction by the State would effectively nullify the Tribe's unquestioned
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seminal case in the area of modem tribal jurisdiction, created the gen-
eral presumption that tribal governments have no regulatory jurisdic-
tion over non-natives when their activities occur on fee land."° This
general rule is not absolute,101 but instead creates a rebuttable pre-
authority to regulate the use of its resources by members and non-members"); Washing-
ton Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
RCRA does not authorize a state to regulate Indians on native lands); see also Stephen
E. Woodbury, New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe: When Can a State Concurrently
Regulate Hunting and Fishing by Nonmembers on Reservation Lands?, 14 N.M. L.
REV. 349 (1984) (discussing concurrent state-tribal jurisdiction as it affects hunting and
fishing rights).
99. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
100. Id. at 565. The general proposition is "that the inherent sovereign powers of
an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Id. The
Supreme Court decided two similar cases around the time of Montana. Read in con-
junction, these cases seem to limit the general presumption Montana creates because
they establish independent grounds on which to analyze tribal assertions of civil regula-
tory jurisdiction.
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980), a pre-Montana case, the Court held that "[tiribal powers are not implicitly
divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent status." Id. at 153. Instead, the Court
"found such a divestiture in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be
inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government." Id.
In the environmental control context, there will never be the problem of inconsis-
tency with national standards because tribal pollution control programs are subject to
EPA approval and must meet minimum federal standards. See infra notes 143-81 and
accompanying text for a discussion of tribes' roles under federal environmental pro-
grams. See also Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 963-
64 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying Colville and Montana alternatively in allowing tribal regu-
latory authority under either test).
In the post-Montana case of Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982),
the Court upheld a tribal severance tax on oil and gas production on tribal land which
the tribal governments imposed on non-natives. Id. at 137. The Court found that the
power to tax did not derive solely from the tribe's power to exclude non-natives from
tribal land, but rather from the tribe's general sovereign authority to control economic
activity in its jurisdiction. Id. Furthermore, the Court concluded that even if the tribe
derived the power to tax solely from its exclusionary power, then non-natives lawfully
entering tribal lands would remain subject to a tribe's power to exclude. Id. at 144.
Also, tribes possessed the lesser but related power to place conditions on non-natives'
conduct and presence on the reservation. Id. at 144-45. See also Morris v. Hitchcock,
194 U.S. 384 (1904) (upholding tribal tax based on the tribe's power to exclude non-
members); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905) (relying on the power to exclude
in upholding a requirement that non-Indians must pay a fee to trade within the reserva-
tion's borders); cf. Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.
1983) (upholding tribal power to condition vehicle repossession on native vehicle
owner's consent), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
101. 450 U.S. at 565. "To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on
non-Indian fee lands." Id. (emphasis added).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
150 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 41:133
sumption if the tribal regulation falls under either of two broad excep-
tions. First, a tribe may regulate nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe."°2 Second, a tribe may assert regulatory
jurisdiction if nonmembers' activities threaten or directly affect the
tribe's political integrity, economic security or health and welfare."0 3
The second exception becomes more important, and its reasoning
more powerful, for purposes of environmental protection. However,
both exceptions enable a tribe to control the reservation environment.
For example, Montana's first exception will apply to nearly all reserva-
tion enterprises that are subject to federal environmental laws. Many
reservation lands contain an abundance of natural resources.1°4 Busi-
nesses seeking these resources have to enter mining leases or other con-
tractual arrangements in order to obtain access to raw materials
located on tribal land. 0 5 This scenario subjects a non-native business
to tribal regulations when it is located on fee land."°6 In addition, the
first Montana exception does not require a nexus between the consen-
sual agreement and the regulated activity. 107
Furthermore, the consensual relationship exception10 8 pertaining to
commercial dealings does not require an explicit arrangement or con-
tract."09 This becomes important for tribal jurisdiction over businesses
operating landfills or hazardous waste sites located on fee land. The
only jurisdictional requirement needed to regulate such enterprises is
102. Id. "A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its mem-
bers, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Id.
103. Id. at 566.
104. See Allen, supra note 13, at 887 (noting that many tribes own great mineral
wealth).
105. See, e.g., FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1312 (9th Cir.
1990) (enforcing the Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance which required all reserva-
tion employers to give mandatory hiring preference to natives).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1315 (relying on Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982)). In FMC, the valid employment ordinance had no direct
link with the mining leases and contracts. Id.
108. See supra note 102 and accompanying text for an explanation of the consensual
relationship exception as enumerated in Montana.
109. See, e.g., Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 593 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984) (upholding Navajo regulation of non-Indi-
ans because of their business dealings on the reservation with tribal members); Cardin v.
De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982) (upholding
the application of health and safety regulations to non-Indian grocery store owner on
fee land because he opened his store for tribal business).
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for the tribe and the business to engage in commerce. 110 Thus, as long
as the tribe's solid waste contributes to the landfill or dump, the juris-
dictional requirement is satisfied.
The second Montana exception always applies to enterprises subject
to federal pollution control laws. Any pollution source is a direct
threat to tribal health and welfare... and can affect tribal economic
security by decreasing the value of tribal lands located near the
source." 2 Pollution can also affect a tribe's political integrity when-
ever a tribal regulation is challenged.' 1
3
Thus, under either of Montana's broad exceptions, tribes have the
jurisdictional authority to regulate the entire reservation, including
non-native owned fee land. However, the Supreme Court recently
complicated the Montana analysis in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
110. See FMC, 905 F.2d at 1315 (stating that a non-native company subjects itself
to the civil jurisdiction of tribes when it actively engages in commerce with the tribes).
111. See Babbitt Ford, 710 F.2d at 593. The Babbitt court found that vehicle re-
possession consent regulation "is designed to keep reservation peace and protect the
health and safety of tribal members. The Navajo reservation covers a vast expansion of
land. Repossession of an automobile has the potential to leave a tribal member stranded
miles from his or her nearest neighbor." Id. See also Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe
Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding that zoning ordinance "re-
lates substantially to the general welfare of those living on the Reservation and reflects
the Tribes' concern over the perceived threat to the rural character of the Reservation
and the lifestyle of a majority of those living on the Reservation"); Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977
(1982) (holding that the tribe had authority to regulate the common law riparian rights
of non-Indians owning property bordering reservation property because of the potential
affect on tribal health and welfare).
112. Namen, 665 F.2d at 964. The court reasoned that the use of the non-Indian
property on the border of the reservation property, a lake, could create a pollution
problem resulting in damage to the economy, welfare, and health of the tribes. Id. See
also FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990). The FMC
court did not reach the second Montana exception, but if it had, the court surely would
have found that FMC's activity affected the tribe's economy since FMC was the largest
employer on the reservation and was making royalty payments to the tribe.
Tribal courts have also applied the Montana exceptions to uphold tribal ordinances
and regulations. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Cavenham Forest Industries,
14 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6043 (Colv. Tr. Ct., Nov. 16,
1987) (granting preliminary injunction against landfill operator because its activities
"have the ability to affect the value of surrounding Indian allotments and thereby may
affect the economic security of the tribes and its members").
113. Colville, 14 Indian L. Rep. at 6043. "Cavenham's refusal to recognize the
tribes' power to regulate zoning on the reservation directly affects the tribes' political
integrity." Id.
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and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation.114
B. Brendale: Narrowing the Exceptions
Brendale consisted of two cases consolidated on appeal. In the first
case, Philip Brendale, a non-member, attempted to divide his twenty
acre parcel of land located on the reservation's closed area into two
cabin sites. 15 In the second case, Stanley Wilkinson, also a non-mem-
ber, sought to subdivide his thirty-two acres located in the open area of
the reservation.116 Both proposed subdivisions complied with Yakima
County zoning but violated the tribal zoning ordinances. 17
Three divergent opinions made up the Supreme Court's holding in
Brendale. A plurality of four justices,11 ' joined by two concurring jus-
tices, 119 held that the tribe does not have the authority to zone non-
member fee lands in the open area. However, the two concurring jus-
tices, joined in part by the three dissenting justices, 120 held that the
tribe has the power to zone non-member property in the closed area.
Therefore, Brendale's ultimate holding is that tribes may enforce their
zoning laws on non-member fee land in reservation areas that are
closed to the public, but not in areas open to the public.
In his plurality opinion, Justice White narrowly interpreted the sec-
ond Montana exception1 2 and concluded that it did not apply to every
situation adversely affecting the tribe.1 22 The impact on the tribe must
114. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
115. Id. at 417-18. The Yakima Reservation consists of two parts: a "closed area"
which is closed to the general public and an "open area" to which the public has access.
Id. at 415-16.
116. Id. at 418.
117. Id.
118. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy joined Justice White's plurality. 492
U.S. at 414.
119. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Stevens' concurring opinion. Id. at 433.
120. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion with which Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined. Id. at 448.
121. The parties agreed that the first Montana exception did not apply because
Brendale and Wilkinson had no "consensual relationship" with the Yakima Nation sim-
ply by owning reservation land. Id. at 428.
122. Id. at 431. The plurality found it "significant that the so-called second Mon-
tana exception is prefaced by the word 'may'.... This indicates to us that a tribe's
authority need not extend to all conduct that 'threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,' but in-
stead depends on the circumstances." Id. at 428-29 (quoting Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
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be demonstrably serious and imperil the tribe's political integrity, eco-
nornic security, or health and welfare. 2 3 White reasoned that the
county zoning ordinance did not seriously threaten tribal interests. 2 4
Thus, White held that the tribe cannot zone non-native fee lands, re-
gardless of whether it is in open area. 125
In stark opposition, Justice Blackmun's dissent 126 found that the
tribe has the authority to zone all non-member fee land in either the
open or the closed area.1 21 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the ability
to zone reservation land fell within the second Montana exception be-
cause of the Indians' "unique historical and cultural connection to the
land." 128 Moreover, Justice Blackmun declared that once the tribe de-
cides to exercise its power to zone, the power is exclusive because any
concurrent zoning would be unworkable.129
Justice Stevens' concurrence 3 ° was essential to the ultimate disposi-
tion of the case because he distinguished the open areas on the reserva-
tion from the closed areas. Stevens based his opinion on the tribal
government's power to exclude non-members from their territory.
1 31
He reasoned that because only a small portion of the closed area was
fee land, 132 the tribe retained its exclusionary power throughout most
of the area. 3 3 Therefore, the tribe's ability to define and maintain the
closed area's pristine character by zoning non-members' land was not
impaired merely because non-members owned a few parcels of land.
1 34
123. 492 U.S. at 431.
124. Id. at 432.
125. Id.
126. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
127. 492 U.S. at 465.
128. Id. at 458.
129. Id. at 466-68.
130. Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. 492 U.S. at 434. See also supra note 100, discussing Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) and the power to exclude as an independent basis to
regulate the entire reservation.
132. Id. at 438. Only 25,000 of the 807,000 acres in the closed area was owned in
fee. Id.
133. Id. at 441. "By maintaining the power to exclude nonmembers from entering
all but a small portion of the closed area, the Tribe has preserved the power to define the
essential character of that area. In fact, the Tribe has exercised this power, taking care
that the closed area remains an undeveloped refuge of cultural and religious signifi-
cance. . . ." Id.
134. Id. "[T]he fact that a very small proportion of the closed area is owned in fee
does not deprive the Tribe of the right to ensure that this area maintains its unadulter-
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Stevens distinguished the open area because non-natives held almost
half of the land in fee.135 Since the tribe could no longer exclude non-
members from much of the open area, they also could not zone non-
members' land in the area. 13 6 Stevens also emphasized the tribe's in-
ability to maintain the open area's unspoiled character because most of
the fee land was industrialized and developed.137
Brendale's application is extremely problematic because neither Jus-
tice White's narrow reading of Montana nor Justice Stevens' "power to
exclude" analysis examine tribal authority to impose regulations on the
reservation.
Justice White fails to articulate clear standards for future courts fac-
ing similar fact situations in various regulatory contexts. The "circum-
stances" sufficient to threaten the tribe and thereby allow it to regulate
non-natives on fee land are not clearly spelled out. In the environmen-
tal context, however, the presence of an enterprise subject to federal
environmental laws clearly poses a demonstrably serious threat.138
Justice Stevens' approach creates checkerboard jurisdiction, which is
particularly troublesome in the environmental context. Checkerboard
jurisdiction spawns inconsistent standards, undermines comprehensive
environmental planning and encourages enterprises to locate in areas
with the most relaxed standards.139 This may tempt local or tribal
governments to relax their standards in order to lure profitable enter-
prises onto their land.
Even under the difficult Brendale analysis, tribes still retain author-
ated character." Id. at 444. Furthermore, Stevens determined that Congress, in enact-
ing the Dawes Act, did not intend that Tribes would lose control of their reservations
simply because non-members owned a few small parcels of land within the reservation.
Id. at 441.
135. 492 U.S. at 446. Stevens also emphasized that non-natives in the open area
could not participate in tribal elections. Id. at 445.
136. Id. at 444-45. "Because the Tribe no longer has the power to exclude non-
members from a large portion of this area, it also lacks the power to define the essential
character of the territory." Id.
137. Id. at 445. "In 'sharp contrast to the pristine, wilderness-like character of the
'Closed Area," the open area is marked by 'residential and commercial
developmen[t].'" Id. (quoting Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 750,
752 (E.D. Wash. 1985)).
138. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text discussing how governmental
controls on pollution affect a tribe's political integrity, economic security, and health
and welfare.
139. See Royster & Fausett, supra note 71, at 656 (concluding that checkerboardjurisdiction adversely affects the tribal pollution control scheme).
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ity to regulate the reservation environment. Moreover, the Brendale
Court stressed the fact that Congress did not expressly delegate the
power to zone fee lands to the tribe."4 However, some environmental
laws expressly delegate jurisdiction on fee lands to native govern-
ments. 14 1 In those instances, jurisdictional analysis is unnecessary.
Other environmental statutes do not explicitly grant tribes jurisdiction
over fee lands. 42 Therefore, unless precluded by congressional amend-
ment, courts must undertake the complicated and imprecise jurisdic-
tional analysis enumerated in Brendale.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
Congress has taken steps to recognize native governments' status as
the primary decision-making body for reservation environmental mat-
ters.143 However, only the Clean Water Act (CWA) and Clean Air Act
(CAA) delegate jurisdiction over all reservation lands to the tribes.' 1
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA) treats tribes as states in certain circmstances
but fails to define the jurisdictional bounds in which tribal authority
governs.'45 The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) delegates the abil-
ity to make jurisdictional determinations on a case-by-case basis to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), thus leaving the jurisdic-
tional question an open issue. 1 6 The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) contains no provisions dealing with
tribes as states, but the EPA regulations contemplate some tribal par-
140. 492 U.S. at 428.
141. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988); see also infra notes 149-61 and accompanying text discuss-
ing recent Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act amendments.
142. See, eg., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988); Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-13 6y (1988); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
143. The EPA has also taken steps to recognize tribal authority as the primary
regulating body for the entire reservation environment. See EPA INDIAN POLICY,
supra note 76; see also Administration of Indian Programs by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. 4 (June 23, 1989) (statement of F. Henry Habicht III, Deputy Administrator,
EPA).
144. See infra notes 149-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of CWA and
CAA.
145. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA.
146. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of SDWA.
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ticipation. 47 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
ignores jurisdiction and merely views tribes as municipalities, creating
serious problems for tribal authority. 148 As a result, the CERCLA,
SDWA, FIFRA, and especially RCRA are in dire need of amendment.
A. CWA and CAA
Congress amended the Clean Water Act'49 in 1987 to allow tribes to
be treated as "states" for certain purposes.' 50 However, this treatment
is qualified by certain criteria.'' If the tribe meets the criteria, Con-
gress clearly provides that the tribe may apply its own standards to the
entire reservation regardless of ownership. 152 Thus, any state law pur-
porting to apply to fee land is expressly preempted by congressional
delegation.' 53 In light of this express power, recent EPA regulations
interpreting the CWA amendments are puzzling because they require
the tribe to include the legal basis for their jurisdictional claim in their
application for status as a state."' The regulations also state that the
EPA regional administrator will resolve challenges to tribal jurisdic-
tion. "' Such a jurisdictional determination is unnecessary because a
147. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of FIFRA.
148. See infra notes 171-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of RCRA.
149. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
150. Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 60 (codi-
fied as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1377(e) (1988)).
151. The tribe must show that its governing body carries out substantial govern-
mental duties and powers, the tribe's management and protection of water resources
occurs within the reservation boundaries, and the tribe must prove to the EPA that it is
capable of carrying out the Act's substantive provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
152. Section 1377(e) provides in pertinent part:
The administrator is authorized to treat an Indian tribe as a State .... but only
if-
(2) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management
and protection of water resources which are held by an Indian tribe, held by the
United States in trust for the Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such
property interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within
the borders of an Indian reseration....
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2) (emphasis added).
153. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 428 (citing the CWA amendment and comparing its express regulatory delega-
tion to tribes with Congress' failure to "expressly delegate] to the Yakima Nation the
power to zone fee lands").
154. 40 C.F.R. § 130.6 (1991).
155. 40 C.F.R. § 130.15 (1991).
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tribe that meets the criteria for treatment as a state1 56 need only show
that its functions under the Act pertain to resources within the reserva-
tion boundaries. 157
The recent Clean Air Act amendments 58 treat native tribes in a
fashion similar to the CWA. For example, its provision delegating ju-
risdiction is virtually identical to the CWA's. 159 Under the CAA, a
tribe must meet the same criteria as in the CWA in order to be treated
as a state."6 Once it meets that criteria, jurisdictional analysis is again
unnecessary for exactly the same reasons as under the CWA. 161 Thus,
any future EPA regulations should not contemplate jurisdictional
questions because Congress has already settled the issue.
B. CER CLA
The 1986 amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act 162 enumerate specific situa-
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(eX1) and (3).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(eX2).
158. See, eg., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 107, 104
Stat. 2464 (1990).
The 1977 amendments give tribes the ability to redesignate air quality standards for
the entire reservation, regardless of ownership, by allowing Indians to exercise authority
anywhere inside the reservation's borders. The 1977 amendment provides that all
"lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations of federally recognized Indian
tribes may be redesignated only by the appropriate Indian governing body." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7474(c) (1988). See generally Patrick Smith & Jerry D. Guenther, Note, Environmen-
tal Law: Protecting Clean Air: The Authority of Indian Governments to Regulate Reser-
vation Airsheds, 9 AM. INDIAN L. Rv. 83 (1981). See also 40 C.F.R. § 52.2 1(gX4)
(1986) (EPA regulations for Indian redesignations containing language similar to 42
U.S.C. § 7474(c)).
Even before the 1977 amendments delegating authority to tribes, the Ninth Circuit
approved an EPA delegation order which approved the Northern Cheyenne Tribe's
redesignation of its reservation air quality standards. See Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701
(9th Cir. 1981).
159. The Clean Air amendment provides that the tribe shall be treated as a state
"only if- (B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management
and protection of air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other
areas within the tribe's jurisdiction." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-549, § 107(d), 104 Stat. 2464, 2464-65 (1990) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7601(d)(2)(B) (1990)).
160. See supra note 151, setting forth the criteria for state status.
161. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text, discussing policy and provi-
sions of the CWA.
162. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), amended the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
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tions in which tribes shall be treated as states. 163 Unlike the CWA and
CAA, however, Congress does not expressly delegate jurisdictional au-
thority to tribes.1" By failing to clearly define tribes' jurisdictional
boundaries, Congress has given little guidance to tribes attempting to
implement their own CERCLA programs; tribes are unsure as to the
scope of their programs. For example, tribal implementation of CER-
CLA programs to non-Indian enterprises located within reservation
boundaries may lead to protracted litigation in which these enterprises
challenge tribal jurisdiction under CERCLA. Thus, CERCLA's provi-
sions pertaining to Indian tribes are incomplete without a clear defini-
tion of tribal jurisdictional authority.
C. SDWA
In 1986, Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act165 to allow
tribes to warrant state treatment. 116 Like CERCLA, the SDWA also
does not expressly delegate jurisdiction to tribes. Instead, it delegates
jurisdictional determinations to the EPA.167 The statutory framework
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988).
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a). Tribes are treated as states for purposes of several
CERCLA provisions including notification of releases, consultation on remedial ac-
tions, access to information, roles and responsibilities under the national contingency
plan, and submittal of priorities for remedial action. Id.
164. Under the CWA, Congress has expressly defined tribal jurisdiction as any-
where "within the borders of an Indian reservation." 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2). Under
the CAA, Congress has defined tribal jurisdiction as anywhere "within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7601(d)(2)(B). In contrast, Congress does not define tribal jurisdiction under
CERCLA.
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988).
166. Id. at § 300j-11(a)(1).
167. In other words, the CWA and CAA provide that tribes may be treated as states
if their proposed program is applied within the reservation borders and the tribe other-
wise meets the criteria for state treatment. Thus, Congress solves the jurisdictional is-
sue by expressly stating that tribes can regulate the entire reservation, regardless of
ownership. See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
In contrast, the SDWA provides that the EPA may treat tribes as states if the tribe's
proposed program is applied within the area of their jurisdiction and the tribe otherwise
meets the criteria to qualify as a state. Thus, the CWA and CAA define the tribe's
jurisdiction as anywhere within the reservation boundaries; while the SDWA leaves the
jurisdictional determination to the EPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 300j- 1(b)(1)(B), which pro-
vides that treatment as a state "shall be authorized only if. . . . the functions to be
exercised by the Indian Tribe are within the area of the Tribal Government's jurisdic-
tion.. ." Id.
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of the SDWA mandates a time-consuming and expensive administra-
tive process. During this process, jurisdictional analysis is necessary at
least once by the EPA, and potentially several times if a court reviews
the EPA determination. As a result, Congress has created costly litiga-
tion and tribes must allocate scarce funds and resources toward attor-
ney's fees and court costs rather than implementation and
enforcement. Additionally, the EPA determines jurisdiction on a case-
by-case basis which leads to potential inconsistent determinations.
Each time a tribe submits a program, the affected state may challenge
tribal jurisdiction before the EPA makes a final ruling. 161 Congress
could effectively preclude long court battles and foreclose potential in-
consistencies by amending the SDWA with provisions similar to those
in the CWA and CAA.
D. FIFRA
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 169 contains
no provisions for treating tribes as states. The only mention of native
tribes in FIFRA is a provision allowing the EPA to delegate tribal au-
thority to implement pesticide applicator certification programs. 7 °
FIFRA is an example of a statute which neglects Indian tribes and
should be amended to facilitate greater tribal participation in all as-
pects of the statute's scheme.
E. RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act" 1 is another example
of an environmental statute which ignores native governments.1 72 Ju-
risdictional disputes under RCRA are likely to increase in the near
future with the advent of solid and hazardous waste disposal as a seri-
168. Tribes receive enforcement authority via a three step process: I) the tribe
must seek and acquire treatment as a state; 2) the tribe may apply for a grant for a
Public Water System or Underground Injection Control Program; and, 3) the tribe may
then apply for primary enforcement authority for their program. 40 C.F.R. § 35.465
(1990). Notice and comment procedures allow states thirty days after submission of a
tribe's application to challenge tribal jurisdictional claims. 40 C.F.R. § 142.78(c)
(1990).
169. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
170. Id. § 136u(a).
171. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
172. The only mention of Indians in the statute is in the definition section which
defines "municipality" to include "an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization."
Id § 6903(13).
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ous problem on and near many reservations. 173 Furthermore, waste
disposal enterprises are targeting Indian reservations with increased
vigor.1
74
RCRA is the only environmental statute considered in this Note that
neither contains tribe-as-states provisions nor authorizes tribal imple-
mentation of any substantive provisions. Furthermore, in light of re-
cent case law, Congress' failure to amend RCRA with provisions for
full tribal participation in RCRA programs will continue the line of
inequitable court rulings. In Washington Department of Ecology v.
EPA, 7 5 the Ninth Circuit held that RCRA applied to Indian reserva-
tions. 176 However, tribal sovereignty advocates did not oppose the de-
cision 177 because its application foreclosed state regulatory authority
over Native Americans on the reservation.
178
Additionally, a recent Eighth Circuit case demonstrates the
problems that can occur when RCRA is applied to the reservation. In
Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs179 the court relied
on Washington Department of Ecology, holding that RCRA applied to
open dumps on the reservation and imposed liability on the tribe for
RCRA violations.' By amending RCRA to allow full tribal partici-
pation, Congress can avoid the inequitable result of imposing liability
on tribes for RCRA violations absent their ability to obtain primary
regulatory authority to implement their own RCRA scheme.' 8 '
173. See supra note 78 and accompanying text, discussing the growth of the pollu-
tion problem on Indian reservations.
174. See Pamela A. D'Angelo, Waste Management Industry Turns to Indian Reser-
vations as States Close Landfills, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1607, 1609 (Dec. 28, 1990)
(tempting tribes with the prospect of providing reservations with profitable businesses
and jobs in order to get around the dearth of state facilities and avoid state taxes).
175. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
176. Id. at 1469.
177. See, eg., Du Bey, supra note 2, at 503 (noting that the Washington Department
of Ecology decision encouraged tribal self-government over hazardous waste
management).
178. The Washington Department of Ecology court held that the EPA regional ad-
ministrator properly refused to approve a proposed state program because RCRA does
not authorize states to regulate natives on the reservation. 752 F.2d at 1467-68. The
court, however, evaded the issue of whether the state could implement their program to
regulate non-natives on reservations. Id. at 1468.
179. 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
180. Id. at 1097.
181. Senator McCain of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs has ex-
pressed hope that Congress will amend RCRA so that it treats tribes as states. See
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V. CONCLUSION
Amending all environmental laws to allow Native American tribes
to regulate the environment throughout the reservation, even if it af-
fects non-natives, will serve several useful purposes. First, amend-
ments will promote the federal Indian policy goals of tribal self-
determination without undermining pollution control laws because the
EPA must first approve tribal environmental programs. Second, con-
gressional amendments will create certainty in environmental regula-
tion because the regulated parties will avoid checkerboard jurisdiction.
Finally, and most importantly, the amendments will foster tribal sover-
eignty by allowing native governments to take responsibility for the
health and welfare of their people and their land.
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